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Sir,
I read with great interest the recent review article
by Kendrick et al.1 regarding infection control in
lung function (LF) equipment. I share the authors’
view that ‘‘There is clear evidence that respiratory
equipment becomes contaminated with microor-
ganisms of probable respiratory tract origin during
use’’ and their view that ‘‘there is a need for clear
procedures to be in place to reduce possible risks to
a realistic minimum.’’ I agree with some of their
recommendations, such as the referring clinicians
should complete an LF testing request form for
each patient with questions relating to the
patient’s infection and immunity status; the pa-
tients with known infections are tested at the end
of the day or in their own rooms. However, I do not
agree with some of their other views and recom-
mendations:1. I disagree with the authors’ view that for the
majority of patients, there will be no significant
risk of cross-infection from having LF tests.1
Chronically ill patients and elderly persons (65-
years old or over) are susceptible to respiratory
infections2 and should be considered as high-risk
subjects to cross-infection in LF tests. These
individuals plus immunocompromised patients
and infected patients would probably make up
more than 50% of the population for LF testing in
most clinical LF laboratories/units. (In the past
ten years, more than 70% subjects tested in my
unit were elderly.)2. I disagree with the authors’ view that stringent
precautions are not justified for the majority of
the patients undergoing LF tests based on the
current evidence of minimal cross-infection
associated with LF equipment.1 In my view, to
make infection control recommendations for LF
tests, we should not rely only on the current
evidence that may result from ‘‘publication bias,
the impracticality of performing large scaleee front matter Crown Copyright & 2005 Published by Els
med.2004.12.003monitoring studies, and probably the lack of
enthusiasm for this type of study.’’1 Currently,
with respect to cross-infection associated with
LF test, there are no contamination study data
available on unheated pneumotachographs, tur-
bine spirometers or hot-wire spirometers; there
are very few bacterial studies on patients and no
viral data at all on LF equipment and patients.
Therefore, we should use theoretical rationales
to make the recommendations. Theoretically,
the risk of cross-infection via LF tests may be
substantial. When performing LF tests, patients
often create a large amount of visible and
invisible droplets of saliva or mucus, which
may contain many pathogens, by forced exhala-
tion and coughing. If no barrier filters are
applied, the droplets may deposit into the
breathing circuits of LF equipment. In this case,
if only mouthpieces are replaced and no other
infection control measures are taken between
patients, the deposited droplets may be aero-
solized by the subsequent patients through high
inspiratory flow rates during LF tests and inhaled
into their lungs; more importantly, the droplets
may be desiccated quickly and become easily
inhalable droplet nuclei.3 Therefore, contami-
nated LF equipment may become an important
source of infective pathogens and pose a
significant risk to the patients undergoing LF
tests. Although only a few cases of cross-
infection associated with LF testing have been
reported, the true number of the case could be
grossly underestimated due to ignorance, con-
cealment, technical difficulty or the lack of
infection control guidelines and surveillance.
Recently, a registered nurse informed me that in
1996, her immunocompromised daughter suf-
fered from chest infection of Pseudomonas after
performing some LF tests (without a single-use
filter) on a device, which were shared by some
cystic fibrosis patients, in an LF laboratory.
While her respiratory specialist considered that
the infection was possibly due to the contami-
nated LF device, some people related it to ‘‘bad
luck’’. This case was not reported until I wroteevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Surveillance and Response, World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) in August 2003. I think it is
possible that many cases like this have gone
unreported. Pre-LF test screening by the request
form, although helpful, cannot substitute other
effective infection control measures, because it
is very difficult to identify all the patients with
either infectious diseases or immunocompro-
mised illnesses by clinical signs. A recent study
shows as many as 40% clinically stable chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) patients
have positive sputum cultures to potentially
pathogenic microorganisms.4 Also, it is imprac-
tical to test each patient for all infectious
diseases before LF testing. Therefore, universal
stringent precautions for everyone in LF tests
are really needed and highly justified. In 1991,
the head author of the recent article clearly
recommended, based on the theory of ratio-
nales, that ‘‘Breathing circuits: All testing
equipment that comes into direct or close
contact with mucous membranes, i.e. mouth-
pieces, pneumotachographs, tubing and re-
breathing valves, should be disinfected before
use on other patients.’’5 However, the recent
article states: ‘‘Breathing circuits: in practice,
disinfection at the end of each day, rather than
between each patient should be sufficient.’’1 I
would like to question the head author’s reasons
why the previous recommendation with univer-
sal high-level measure for breathing circuits has
been significantly downgraded, despite the fact
that the incidence of infectious diseases has
been increasing in recent years.3. Respiratory viral infections, which may be easily
transmitted by infected aerosols, account for
significant mortality and morbidity. Much smal-
ler doses of viruses than that of bacteria may
cause respiratory infections.6 The authors of the
recent article only list one respiratory virus
(rhinovirus) and do not mention other important
respiratory viruses, such as influenza virus,
respiratory syncytial virus, and severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS)-associated corona-
virus that suddenly and lethally attacked people
around the world without warning in 2003 and
remains a severe threat. In addition, the authors
consider the cross-infection of a common cold as
only causing inconvenience to patients. In fact,
to healthy people it may cause substantial
discomfort, absenteeism and economic losses;3
to patients with asthma or COPD, it may cause
severe exacerbations and complications. I be-
lieve that, any preventable cross-infection ac-
quired from LF testing is not acceptable.4. Some recommendations in the recent article are
substandard. For exercise testing breathing
circuits (Hans Rudolf valves), it states: ‘‘Dis-
mantling, washing in hand-hot soapy water,
rinsing and drying should be sufficient to ensure
adequate cleaning and disinfection.’’1 I would
like to question the authors the scientific basis
and the efficiency of this disinfection method. A
study, which used an insensitive sampling meth-
od described by the head and the third authors,7
found that 13% of the samples from a heated
pneumotachograph were contaminated. But in
the recent article, the authors only recommend
‘‘minimal cleaning’’.15. One recommendation in the recent article is
impractical and inefficient. In Table 3, the
recommendation of disinfection for breathing
circuits shows: ‘‘Patient valves—clean between
patients with alcohol wipes.’’1 (It implies that
the authors are concerned over the contamina-
tion of the proximal rebreathing parts of LF
equipment between patients.) But the disad-
vantages of alcohol wipe, as pointed out by the
authors in Table 1,1 are that valves and flow
sensors cannot be decontaminated thoroughly
by this method (parts of them easily missed).6. The authors recommend high-level precautions
for peak flow meter: ‘‘either a one-way valve
mouthpiece or a new barrier filter should be
used for each patient.’’1 On the other hand, they
consider that the routine use of filters in LF tests
is difficult to justify due to cost constraints,1
which is not consistent with the former recom-
mendation. Good quality barrier filters with high
filtration efficiency, low air resistance and small
dead space have been available for at least 5
years. The main advantage of applying single-
use high-efficient filters in LF testing is that they
can protect: (a) breathing circuits, especially
flow sensors from contamination with droplets of
saliva and mucus,8 which may contain micro-
organisms and induce test errors; (b) patients
from inhaling pathogens from the breathing
circuits; (c) the air of the surrounding area from
contaminated aerosols, hence the technical
staff and the patients. I believe, the universal
use of single-use filters is actually very reason-
able and cost-effective, and can reduce the
cross-infection risks during LF tests into a
realistic minimum. The barrier filters can also
act as mouthpieces and may significantly reduce
the costs for disinfection, and for replacement
of breathing circuits worn by disinfectants.
Indeed, the cost of a high-efficient filter for LF
testing is very little in many developed coun-
tries. Now in Australia, it costs only AU$
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than the cost of a flu vaccination for a person.
With the cooperation of the world experts to
verify and unify barrier filters, their costs can be
dramatically reduced by mass production, and
can be made affordable to the developing
countries. Moreover, with the application of
media-changeable filters (every filter case being
disinfected after each patient use), the costs
can be further cut by half.
The World Health Report 2003 by WHO9 points
out that: ‘‘New diseases have been emerging at the
unprecedented rate of one a year for the last two
decades, and this trend is certain to continue.’’ In
the first half of 2003, SARS posed a particularly
serious threat to people’s health. Its initial symp-
toms were non-specific and common, and maximum
incubation period, estimated at 10 days, allowed
international spread by air travel. SARS also caused
widespread social disruption and huge economic
losses (estimated US$ 30 billion loss in the Far East
alone).10 One of the lessons learnt from SARS
outbreaks, pointed out in the WHO 2003 annual
report, is that ‘‘weaknesses in health systems can
permit emerging infections to amplify and spread,
and can compromise patient care. The strengthen-
ing of health systems thus deserves high priority.’’9
I believe that, we should rigorously prevent the
spread of the exiting infectious diseases and should
be well prepared against the recurrence of SARS
and the emergence of new highly infectious
diseases, including the next influenza pandemic.
Therefore, we should implement upgraded and
strengthened precautions for all the patients
undergoing LF tests. Until now, applying single-
use high-efficient filters followed by regularly
disinfecting respiratory circuits is the most prac-tical and effective approach to prevent cross-
infection in LF tests.References
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